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نتائج ل
"Management science"
صنف حسب:
Quantifying Managerial Ability: A New Measure and Validity Tests
بواسطة
Lev, Baruch
,
Demerjian, Peter
,
McVay, Sarah
في
Ability
,
Applied sciences
,
Asset management
2012
We propose a measure of managerial ability, based on managers' efficiency in generating revenues, which is available for a large sample of firms and outperforms existing ability measures. We find that our measure is strongly associated with manager fixed effects and that the stock price reactions to chief executive officer (CEO) turnovers are positive (negative) when we assess the outgoing CEO as low (high) ability. We also find that replacing CEOs with more (less) able CEOs is associated with improvements (declines) in subsequent firm performance. We conclude with a demonstration of the potential of the measure. We find that the negative relation between equity financing and future abnormal returns documented in prior research is mitigated by managerial ability. Specifically, more able managers appear to utilize equity issuance proceeds more effectively, illustrating that our more precise measure of managerial ability will allow researchers to pursue studies that were previously difficult to conduct.
This paper was accepted by Mary E. Barth, accounting.
Journal Article
Managing science : developing your research, leadership and management skills
'This book aims to introduce the working research scientists to the art and techniques of management and the skills necessary to be a good and effective manager and leader of science and scientists. This includes understanding the organization and functioning of scientific research establishments (universities, laboratories, research councils, etc.) and how to deal with the associated committee work, recruiting and team building; how to deal with difficulties managing projects and handling risks.\"--back cover.
Trade Credit, Risk Sharing, and Inventory Financing Portfolios
2018
As an integrated part of a supply contract, trade credit has intrinsic connections with supply chain coordination and inventory management. Using a model that explicitly captures the interaction of firms’ operations decisions, financial constraints, and multiple financing channels (bank loans and trade credit), this paper attempts to better understand the risk-sharing role of trade credit—that is, how trade credit enhances supply chain efficiency by allowing the retailer to partially share the demand risk with the supplier. Within this role, in equilibrium, trade credit is an indispensable external source for inventory financing, even when the supplier is at a disadvantageous position in managing default relative to a bank. Specifically, the equilibrium trade credit contract is net terms when the retailer’s financial status is relatively strong. Accordingly, trade credit is the only external source that the retailer uses to finance inventory. By contrast, if the retailer’s cash level is low, the supplier offers two-part terms, inducing the retailer to finance inventory with a portfolio of trade credit and bank loans. Further, a deeper early-payment discount is offered when the supplier is relatively less efficient in recovering defaulted trade credit, or the retailer has stronger market power. Trade credit allows the supplier to take advantage of the retailer’s financial weakness, yet it may also benefit both parties when the retailer’s cash is reasonably high. Finally, using a sample of firm-level data on retailers, we empirically observe the inventory financing pattern that is consistent with what our model predicts.
This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.
Journal Article
Incentives and Problem Uncertainty in Innovation Contests: An Empirical Analysis
بواسطة
Lakhani, Karim R.
,
Lacetera, Nicola
,
Boudreau, Kevin J.
في
Applications
,
Applied sciences
,
Awards
2011
Contests are a historically important and increasingly popular mechanism for encouraging innovation. A central concern in designing innovation contests is how many competitors to admit. Using a unique data set of 9,661 software contests, we provide evidence of two coexisting and opposing forces that operate when the number of competitors increases. Greater rivalry reduces the incentives of all competitors in a contest to exert effort and make investments. At the same time, adding competitors increases the likelihood that at least one competitor will find an extreme-value solution. We show that the effort-reducing effect of greater rivalry dominates for less uncertain problems, whereas the effect on the extreme value prevails for more uncertain problems. Adding competitors thus systematically increases overall contest performance for high-uncertainty problems. We also find that higher uncertainty reduces the negative effect of added competitors on incentives. Thus, uncertainty and the nature of the problem should be explicitly considered in the design of innovation tournaments. We explore the implications of our findings for the theory and practice of innovation contests.
This paper was accepted by Christian Terwiesch, operations management.
Journal Article
White Lies
2012
In this paper we distinguish between two types of white lies: those that help others at the expense of the person telling the lie, which we term
altruistic white lie
s, and those that help both others and the liar, which we term
Pareto white lies
. We find that a large fraction of participants are reluctant to tell even a Pareto white lie, demonstrating a pure lie aversion independent of any social preferences for outcomes. In contrast, a nonnegligible fraction of participants are willing to tell an altruistic white lie that hurts them a bit but significantly helps others. Comparing white lies to those where lying increases the liar's payoff at the expense of another reveals important insights into the interaction of incentives, lying aversion, and preferences for payoff distributions. Finally, in line with previous findings, women are less likely to lie when it is costly to the other side. Interestingly though, we find that women are more likely to tell an altruistic lie.
This paper was accepted by Teck Ho, decision analysis.
Journal Article
Rational Herding in Microloan Markets
2012
Microloan markets allow individual borrowers to raise funding from multiple individual lenders. We use a unique panel data set that tracks the funding dynamics of borrower listings on Prosper.com, the largest microloan market in the United States. We find evidence of rational herding among lenders. Well-funded borrower listings tend to attract more funding after we control for unobserved listing heterogeneity and payoff externalities. Moreover, instead of passively mimicking their peers (irrational herding), lenders engage in active observational learning (rational herding); they infer the creditworthiness of borrowers by observing peer lending decisions and use publicly observable borrower characteristics to moderate their inferences. Counterintuitively, obvious defects (e.g., poor credit grades) amplify a listing's herding momentum, as lenders infer superior creditworthiness to justify the herd. Similarly, favorable borrower characteristics (e.g., friend endorsements) weaken the herding effect, as lenders attribute herding to these observable merits. Follow-up analysis shows that rational herding beats irrational herding in predicting loan performance.
This paper was accepted by Pradeep Chintagunta, marketing.
Journal Article